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Breaking the Prison-Jihadism Pipeline: Prison and Religious Extremism in the War on Terror
Gabriel Rubin
Associate Professor of Justice Studies
Montclair State University

Recent terror attacks in Europe, in which 32 people were killed in Brussels and 130 in Paris along
with hundreds injured, have led to increased attention on the psychological roots of terrorism. One thread
that has gained increased attention (Mufson 2016), but that has not received enough systematic study, is
that of jihadists radicalizing in prison (Hall 2016; Hickey 2016; Bisserbie 2016; Nawaz 2016). The FBI
notes that prisoner radicalization that turns to terrorist violence, while not common, is a serious and
recurring phenomenon (Ballas 2010). The media usually portray the issue as one of ordinary Muslims
radicalized by “bad guys” in prison. But such a formulation is simplistic in that it ignores the outside
forces that lead a prisoner to radicalize.
This chapter argues that jihadist prisoner radicalization is a symptom of tensions and conflicts
going on in the world outside of the prison. Throughout history, prisoners have radicalized in ways that
mirrored outside radical movements and that sought to address prisoner concerns about injustices both in
the prison and in the wider society (Hamm 2013, pg. 1). As Michael Welch notes, summarizing the work
of Scharg and Clemmer, “the inmate social world is shaped by the personal characteristics that convicts
import into prison” (Welch 1995, pg. 155; Schrag 1960; Clemmer 1958; Sykes 1958). Muslim
prisoners—and those who convert to Islam in prison—are part of societies that are in conflict with
Muslims. These conflicts are exhibited by tense relations within civil society, inter-communal tensions,
and even wars. For example, Muslims are more likely to radicalize in French prisons due to factors
external to the prison such as being discriminated against and profiled in France (Haddad 2015, Sageman
2008, ch. 5). Europe in general has done a poorer job than America has of assimilating Muslim
immigrants and, concomitantly, has seen greater tension between Muslims and the “native” populations
(Sageman 2008, ch. 5). These tensions, naturally, spill over into prisons.
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While jihadist prison radicalization is a sign of events and movements occurring outside the
penitentiary, jihadist prisoners are not qualitatively different than other prisoners. They turn to gangs or
extremism for the same reasons. While reading the reasons that jihadist prisoners radicalize the world
over, those acquainted with the literature on corrections and prison gangs will surely find much that is
familiar. The fact is that prisoners who turn to jihad against the West are subject to the same prison
conditions and overcrowding that push other prisoners into other extremist causes. As a recent RAND
report concluded radicalization of prisoners “is neither new nor unique” (Hanna, Clutterbuck and Rubin
2008, pg. x). To this end, the reason that these prisoners turn to jihadism rather than some other form of
radicalization has to do with conflicts going on in the outside world that prisoners are both familiar with
and latch on to.
The chapter will be organized in the following fashion. First, the problem will be framed and
radicalization will be defined. Second, the ways prisoners radicalize will be discussed. Third, the role of
the outside world will be examined. Finally, the argument about why prisoners radicalize will be linked to
how prisoner radicalization can be stopped—like the cause, the solution will be based on political factors.
Building on previous research, this chapter takes a critical criminological approach to explaining
the incidence of jihadist radicalization in prisons. Drawing from Karl Marx’ sociological approach,
critical criminology examines power differentials and inequalities as a way of explaining crime (Lynch
2010; Welch 1995, pg. 107; Welch 1996). As Michael Lynch avers, “critical criminology perspectives
attempt to promote economic, social, and political equity to diminish the production of crime and
disparities in the making and enforcement of law” (Lynch 2010). Critical criminology urges social
scientists to look beyond the simple facts of the crime and instead to explore the social contexts that lead
to the crime. In this light, jihadist radicalization can be seen as a symptom of wider societal problems that
include the treatment of Muslims outside of prisons.
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Framing the Problem and Defining Radicalization

While jihadist prisoner radicalization is a hot topic in the news, there is very little systematic
academic research done on the phenomenon for a few valid reasons. First, it is difficult to access
prisoners who are radicals or in the process of radicalization. Even if prisons grant researchers access to
these sorts of prisoners, certainly not a given (see Hamm 2007 report, pgs. 37-38), jihadist inmates are not
flocking to speak to researchers. Correctional officers and researchers, further, may not know who these
prisoners are—and certainly extremists are not eager to reveal themselves. A second confounding factor
is that current research on the phenomenon shows that the incidence of prisoners who actually radicalized
in prison and went on to attack Western targets as jihadist terrorists is low. Mark Hamm calls these sorts
of prisoners “the spectacular few,” but his study of them unearthed only one strong case of an al Qaedalike prison-group in California. Patrick Dunleavy’s Fertile Soil of Jihad unearths an additional network of
radicalized prisoners in US prisons. However, the people these authors study do not have much success in
their proposed terrorist attacks leaving the question open as to whether they were real threats that were
snuffed out or instead just minor threats. As will be seen in later sections, there have been more cases of
jihadist radicalization in Middle East and European prisons than in US prisons due to political and social
conditions in those regions.
The low incidence of prisoners turning to jihadism in prison may be seen as a reason not to study
the topic—after all, if it doesn’t happen that much, should we really be concerned about it? While such a
view is certainly valid, one must recognize that the study of terrorism in general suffers from a lack of
cases to study (Pinker 2011, chapter 6). For instance, while billions of dollars have gone into counterterrorism since 9/11 (Sahadi 2015), the actual incidence of terrorism in the West, aside from the huge
outlier of the September 11 attacks, has actually gone down over time (The Economist 2016).
As a recent RAND report notes: “Due to the lack of open sources and reluctance on the part of
the authorities to discuss these issues, it is not currently possible to draw any definitive conclusions about
the extent of violent jihadist radicalization and recruitment in European prisons. While there is some
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evidence that problem exists, without greater access to security and prison authorities and, perhaps, to the
prisons themselves, it will remain impossible to quantify its extent” (Hanna, Clutterbuck and Rubin 2008,
pgs. ix-x).
All this said, inmate jihadist radicalization remains a concern because of a few high-profile cases
that cannot be easily dismissed. Further, terrorism operates on human fears. One successful terror attack
can drive a society to panic and push resources toward security or even war (Rubin 2011; Pinker 2011).
Understanding how people radicalize and why they might turn to jihadism due to the conditions of prison
can help subvert such potential problems, which while admittedly not common, are still important.

Defining Radicalization

Before delving into cases of jihadist radicalization, the definition of radicalization needs to be
established. A key question that has not been settled in research on the subject is what prisoner
radicalization means. Mulcahy, Merrington and Bell note that the definition of radicalization, like that of
terrorism, remains contentious and ill-defined not only in scholarly research but also among government
agencies. Agencies within the same government will opt to define radicalization differently making
what’s being studied a matter of debate (Mulcahy, Merrington and Bell 2013, pg. 5). Randy Borum
concurs that radicalization is ill-defined in scholarly sources and adds that too many times radicalization
or extremism are used as proxies for terrorist behavior when, in reality, there are many more radicals than
terrorists (Borum 2011).
In many cases, prisoners that are examined in studies on radicalization were radicals before
entering prison. For instance, Hamm spends a chapter discussing the prison “radicalization” of famous
historical figures such as Adolf Hitler and Mahatma Gandhi—men who had strong political views well
before their incarceration (Hamm 2013, chapter 1; SpearIt 2014). In Israeli prisons, moreover, many
Palestinians are inmates precisely because of their radical views (Merari 2010). In order to isolate the role
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of prison, radicalization must be defined as a process and the universe of cases must be trimmed to cut out
those where prisoners were already radicals before entering prison.
There are real negative side effects of poor conceptualization of terms like radicalization. Some
works, due to the difficulties of gathering information on this subject noted above, have suffered from
selection bias due to authors wanting to include more cases to increase the “N” in their studies (Hamm
2013; Khosrokhavar 2013). The alternative approach taken by scholars of prisoner jihadist radicalization
is to rely on anecdotal examples given the limited number of prisoners that have actually radicalized
while incarcerated (Dunleavy 2011; Mulcahy, Merrington and Bell 2013). This selection bias has watered
down the definition of prisoner radicalization and minimized the role of prisons in the process.
This chapter will use Hanna, Clutterbuck and Rubin’s definition of radicalization as a “process
whereby individuals transform their worldview over time from a range that society tends to consider to be
normal into a range that society tends to consider to be extreme” (Hanna, Clutterbuck, and Rubin 2008,
pg. 2). This is a decidedly subjective definition that rests on the definer’s knowledge of what mainstream
and outside-the-norm views are. However, this definition will be used here precisely because it does not
pre-suppose or pre-judge what a radical will do. For instance, radicalization need not mean someone is
committed to acting out violently or even that he or she believes in violence. As Jenkins argues, not all
people who radicalize turn to violence. Instead, radicalization should be viewed as a process wherein
some people “go all the way” and become violent extremists while others “drop out” at various points
(Jenkins 2007, pg. 4; Hanna, Clutterbuck, and Rubin 2008, pg. 3).
In the next section some cases of prisoner radicalization will be covered to show why the problem
is significant, which will be followed by a section on why and how prison radicalizes people. Following
that, the argument that prisoners radicalize in the ways they do because they are products not just of the
prison world they live in but of the world outside of the prison will be forwarded. The chapter will end
with some proposed solutions.
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Why Prisoner Jihadist Radicalization is Significant
As stated in the previous section, one might argue that due to the small number of cases of prisoners
actually becoming jihadist radicals in prison, the problem is not important. After all, Mark Hamm calls
those who turn radical beliefs into terrorist action “only a tiny, infinitesimal fraction of prison converts to
white supremacy faiths and Islam” (Hamm 2013, pg. 18). While, as previously argued, the actual number
of these sorts of inmates is unknown due to limitations on research, the cases that are known are highly
significant. Some of the men radicalized to become jihadists in prison carried out the worst terror attacks
in modern times. This section will list a few of these cases in order to show the significance of the
problem in the face of potential arguments that this is a low-incidence phenomenon that need not concern
many people.
Abdelhamid Abaaoud was a relatively privileged Belgian immigrant educated at a prestigious,
private Catholic high school. Yet, in Molenbeek, Belgium, the borough of Brussels now notorious for its
mass of jihadis, the son of Moroccan immigrants fell into a crowd of petty criminals who committed
minor crimes of theft and assault (Higgins and Freytas-Timuras 2015). In 2003, at the age of 16, his
parents kicked him out of the house having had had enough of his wild behavior. By 2010, the young
criminal was serving time in Belgian prisons where he met Ibrahim Abdeslam (Faiola and Mekhenet
2015). In 2013, Abaaoud visited Syria for the first time and by January 2014, he was bringing along his
13-year-old younger brother Younes to Syria to fight alongside the Islamic State (Dalton 2015). In Syria,
Abdelhamid Abaaoud dragged the mutilated bodies of Islamic State’s dead enemies from his truck
(Higgins and Freytas-Timuras 2015). On November 13, 2015, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, Ibrahim Abdeslam,
and nine others, killed 129 innocent Parisians in a series of shootings and bombings. Abaaoud and
Abdeslam, who had met in prison, shot up bars and restaurants together along with another man (BBC
News 2016).
Abaaoud’s own father credits the son’s prison stay with his jump from petty criminal to
“extremely professional commando” (CBS News 2015). There, Abaaoud found radical Islam and decided
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to fight for jihad. In a place where he was supposed to be rehabilitating—or at least kept segregated from
the public for its safety—Abaaoud transmuted from a minor thug to one of Europe’s most notorious
terrorist masterminds. To be sure, his “commando” skills were learned under the Islamic State in Syria,
not in prison, but prison was what got him believing in causes like the Islamic State in the first place.
Like Abaaoud, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the creator of al Qaeda in Iraq, which later became ISIS,
began his criminal career with minor offenses. Zarqawi was born in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan.
After his father died in 1984, Zarqawi, a 17 year-old at the time, “became a petty criminal and a thug.” He
was soon imprisoned for possession of drugs and sexual assault (Reidel 2010, pg. 89). Like Abaaoud,
Zarqawi became radicalized in prison. After a general amnesty released Zarqawi in 1988, he married and
went to Afghanistan to join the mujahideen who were fighting the Soviet Union there. However, Zarqawi
was late to the fight and ended up spending his time in Peshawar, Pakistan where he linked up with other
jihadis (Reidel 2010, pg. 90).
In 1992, Zarqawi, now fully indoctrinated in Wahhabi ideology, returned to Jordan to try to
overthrow the Hashemite monarchy there. When Jordanian intelligence officers raided his home in March
of 1994, Zarqawi tried to shoot the officers and then tried to kill himself, but he failed in both attempts. At
trial, Zarqawi called for the King of Jordan to be tried in his stead. The would-be revolutionary was found
guilty of having illegal weapons and being part of an illegal organization and was sent to a desert prison
for fifteen years (Reidel 2010, pg. 92).
In his second stint in Jordanian prison, Zarqawi was joined by his friend Mohamed al-Barqawi,
otherwise known as al-Maqdisi. Maqdisi was another Palestinian who lived in Kuwait and studied in Iraq.
After his studies, Maqdisi met Zarqawi in Pakistan. Maqdisi along with other Palestinians was kicked out
of Kuwait after the first Gulf War in 1991, and came to the al Ruseifah refugee camp in Jordan—the same
camp that Zarqawi had lived in (Reidel 2010, pgs. 92-3).
Maqdisi and Zarqawi formed a radical prison gang. Maqdisi, who wrote two books outlining his
radical religious beliefs and advocating the overthrow of the Saudi royal family, was the spiritual leader
of the group and Zarqawi was the enforcer. In prison, Zarqawi memorized the Koran, made sure other
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inmates in his gang followed religious law such as growing beards, and developed a brutal reputation for
attacking inmates as well as guards (Reidel 2010, pg. 93).
After Jordan’s King Hussein died in February of 1999, his son Abdullah II pardoned many of the
father’s political enemies thus releasing Maqdisi and Zarqawi from prison after they had served less than
five years each. The idea was that pardoning one’s enemies may change them, but Zarqawi set out to plan
his next terrorist attack once he was out of prison (Reidel 2010, pgs. 93-4). He would go on to link up
with al Qaeda and run an organization, al Qaeda in Mesopotomia, that was so brutal and wanton in its
violence that even the leaders of al Qaeda sought to distance themselves from his actions (Reidel 2010,
pgs. 100, 103-4). This group would eventually morph into ISIS, which today also goes by the moniker
Islamic State. That the founder of such an important terrorist group radicalized while in prison speaks to
the importance of the topic.
While an anecdotal list of terrorists radicalized in prison can go on and on, the point is that many
very important jihadists, such as convicted attempted shoe bomber Richard Reid, al Qaeda leader Ayman
al-Zawahiri, Abdelhamid Abaaoud and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, adopted their cause in prison. Indeed, in a
report for the RAND Corporation, Greg Hanna, Lindsay Clutterbuck and Jennifer Rubin list multiple
instances of radicalization in British prisons (Hanna, Clutterbuck and Rubin 2008, pgs. 34-5). Ayman al
Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda, was arrested for plotting to topple the Egyptian regime after the
assassination of Gamal abd al-Nasser. Zawahiri decried the use of torture against him including
whippings, beatings, electric shocks, and “the use of wild dogs” (Till 2011 and Wright 2007, pg. 64).
Brian Till writes in The Atlantic that, “Zawahiri is part of a lineage of giants in the modern jihadi
movement who were further radicalized by their years in prison. There's also Sayyid Qutb, the critical
thinker in the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology [and] the blind sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman
whose terror network Gamaat Islamiya killed scores, and who, years later, inspired the 1993 World Trade
Center bombers in New York mosques” (Till 2011). More recently, terrorists like Abdelhamid Abaaoud
and Salah Abdeslam, an alleged attacker who was captured in Brussels, met in Belgian prison (Mufson
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2016). While in France, Ahmed Coulibaly, who killed four hostages at a Parisian kosher grocery store in
January 2015, served time with the mother of one his accomplices (Birnbaum 2015).
This section shows that jihadist radicalization in prisons is a significant topic for study. The
anecdotal evidence presented above shows that none other than the biggest names in global jihadism
became extremists while in prison. Some, like Zawahiri, had extreme views to begin with. But others, like
Abaaoud and al-Zarqawi, did not and seem to have been radicalized purely while incarcerated. Now that
the problem has been framed and its importance has been emphasized, it is time to turn to how prisoners
are radicalized.

Factors that Lead to Radicalization: General Prison Conditions

In this section, the general prison conditions and related psychological factors that lead prisoners
to radicalize will be examined. As previously discussed, these factors are common to all prisoners who
join extremist groups whether those groups are jihadist or not. As Cilluffo, Cardash, and Whitehead note:
“Historically prisons have served as incubators of extreme ideas, and jihadists would not be the first to
infiltrate and recruit from prisons.” The authors note that inmates are susceptible to radicalization due to
the fact that they “form a captive audience” and can exhibit factors making them vulnerable to
radicalizers such as “alienation, anti-social attitudes, cultural disillusionment, social isolation, and violent
tendencies” (Ciluffo, Cardash, and Whitehead 2007, pg. 114). The same factors that led to the importation
of “street gangs” into prisons (Welch 1995, pg. 156), lead to the spread of jihadist ideologies among
inmates.
In 2005, then-FBI Director Robert Mueller sounded the alarm on prisoner radicalization,
declaring that “prisons are…fertile ground for extremists [and that] Inmates may be drawn to an extreme
form of Islam because it may help justify their violent tendencies” (Hamm 2013, pg. x). Later, Charles
Allen, former Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department of Homeland Security advised the US
Congress in 2009 that the US prison population was susceptible to jihadist radicalization due to prison
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conditions coupled with social marginalization. These factors lead inmates to seek out groups to join and
people with whom to bond—and given the incarceration of prominent jihadists, the groups and
relationships inmates form could certainly lead them to Islamic extremism (Hamm 2013, pg. x).
Penitentiaries since their inception have been intended to transform the incarcerated (Hamm
2013, pgs. 16, 19-20, Welch 1995). But the current era of mass incarceration has made prisons a more
chaotic place where prisoners are more vulnerable to violence and more socially marginalized. These
factors, according to intelligence expert Charles Allen, make prisons an ideal place for spreading terrorist
beliefs (Hamm 2013, pg. 16).
There are shared factors that lead prisoners to turn to turn to extremist or radical beliefs of all
kinds. These include that prisons are increasingly overcrowded (Hamm 51), that guards engage in “diesel
therapy” by frequently moving prisoners from one prison to the next, and that inmates as a population are
more likely than others to be disaffected by society due to their punishments and perhaps their crimes.
Alienation and loneliness are additional factors that may lead the incarcerated to radicalize. As Ciluffo,
Cardash and Whitehead show, “[e]xtremist recruitment preys on alienation” (Ciluffo, Cardash, and
Whitehead 2007, pg. 120). Some studies further exhibit that prisoners desire to join extremist groups
because of the loss of significance they feel (Dugas and Kruglanski 2014).
Environmental factors such as understaffed and overcrowded prisons lead prisoners to seek
protection in groups. Group dynamics certainly play a role in radicalization since extremist organizations
seek out individuals who have not found solace in existing religious views and, in turn, these groups
“impart and anchor their ideology” to such people whose “ideological transformations are, in turn,
reinforced and amplified by group dynamics” (Rascoff 2012; Atran 2010). So prison conditions lead to
alienation and the need for protection, which in turn, lead some prisoners to adopt jihadist religious
worldviews. At this point, the story will sound similar to that of prisoners joining gangs of any stripe
while incarcerated. Subsequent sections—on the role of religion and the effects of the outside world on
prisoners—will help explain why inmates turn to jihadism specifically.
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Let’s first go over prison conditions before turning to how the psychology of the prisoners and
group dynamics lead inmates to radicalize. Khosrokhavar lists three important factors: “overcrowding,
understaffing, and the high turnover of personnel and prisoners” that lead the incarcerated in France to
turn to jihadist extremism (Khosrokhavar 2013, pg. 284). Overcrowding, which, in France, has led to
some cells meant for two prisoners holding three or four, reduces the ability of authorities to supervise
inmate behavior. It also increases tension in the prison as guards are overburdened and prisoners are
underserved. Khosrokhavar notes that guards frequently fail to bring registered prisoners to Muslim
religious services, which is viewed by prisoners as a purposeful slight and by guards as a matter of
prisoner choice (the guards say that the prisoners claim to be sick or want to do something else instead of
going to religious services when called) (Khosrokhavar 2013, pg. 294). Of course, overcrowding in
prisons and the concomitant inability of guards to protect all inmates from each other leads prisoners to
joining gangs all over the world. In America, the rise of prison populations, overcrowding and the
ascension of prison gangs are all connected (The Economist 2014).
Understaffing and turnover of guards and prisoners aggravate the problem. Guards do not have
time to familiarize themselves with the inmates and their surroundings and are also overburdened with
work. Guards that don’t know the prisoners well are unable to pick up who is a radical, who is associating
with whom, and so on (Khosrokhavar 2013, pg. 294). Further, many guards do not know Arabic, so they
suspect the worst when they see any Arabic script written by an inmate. These problems persist despite
France emphasizing the monitoring and collecting of data on Islamic prisoner radicalization “at least a
decade before other major western countries adopted the practice” (Khosrokhavar 2013, pg. 295).
Overcrowding, understaffing and turnover explain why radicalization is allowed to happen but not how
and why it happens.
Psychological factors work alongside prison conditions to lead inmates to radicalize. Michelle
Dugas and Arie Kruglanski argue that prisoners who radicalize do so because they have felt a loss of
significance in their life and seek to become a more significant person. This “quest for significance
orients individuals toward an in-group in an effort to restore” their self-esteem (Dugas and Kruglanski
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2014, pg. 428). Prisoners are a classically humiliated, angry and frustrated group of people who have been
forcibly removed from society. The experience of imprisonment clearly can reduce one’s feeling of
significance in the world and lead an individual to seek out a new foundation for their life. This
foundation, of course, does not have to embody extremism, many prisoners pursue journalism, education
or sports as ways to pass the time (Bell 2016). Suffice it to say, being imprisoned, and being dragged
through the criminal justice system, is a humiliating, disempowering and anxiety-ridden experience that
leaves prisoners emotionally vulnerable (Dugas and Kruglanski 2014, pg. 431).
Relatedly, Patrick Dunleavy in his book The Fertile Soil of Jihad: Terrorism’s Prison Connection
reinforces the fact that the psychology of inmates makes them ripe pickings for those seeking to recruit
for terror organizations. Dunleavy cites a classified CIA study which found that, “Incarcerated individuals
are probably particularly receptive to using violence against a government by which they feel they have
been wronged” (Dunleavy 2011, pg. 23). He further notes that an FBI report found that prisoners are
particularly susceptible to radicalization as they feel discriminated against by the government and may
feel hostile toward authority. The FBI report goes on to note that, in addition to the possibility of inmates
having violent tendencies, they may also seek acceptance, power and influence, and desire to right the
(perceived) wrongs committed against them (Dunleavy 2011, pgs. 23-4).
Psychological factors, such as alienation and disaffection, explain why prisoners seek out new
groups or gangs to join while in prison. They join these gangs for social, psychological and personal
security reasons (Welch 1995, pgs. 156-158; The Economist 2014). As Clarke Jones and Resurrecion
Morales note, “a prison gang’s strict code of conduct and ideological influence may provide the
circumstances for an inmate to adopt a new belief system, social identity, and pattern of behavior” (Jones
and Morales 2012, pg. 212). Prisoners who are not part of existing gangs or groups need to link up with
others for protection as well as for social and psychological reasons. As Sune Haugbolle writes in a
chapter on Syrian prisoners, “Imprisonment disfigures individuals through extended absence from the
ones they love and leaves them with a sense of broken personal history, wasted time and emptiness”
(Haubolle 2010, pg. 229). In the words of a federal prisoner housed in Terminal Island: “associating
12

yourself with some clique in prison is very important because it gives you a sense of security and an
alliance which you can build strong bonds with. The reality of prison is that you cannot survive without
the help of others” (SpearIt 2013, pg. 25).
These psychological factors are made worse by prison conditions such as overcrowding and
understaffing. Further, guards, who may not speak the inmates’ language, have become increasingly
suspicious of potentially jihadist behavior. This makes life worse for all Muslim prisoners, but especially
those who are not jihadists. These people are targeted for extra surveillance and scrutiny because of their
religion.

Factors that Lead to Radicalization: The Role of Religion and What Might Be Special About
Jihadists

In this section, the role of religion in jihadist radicalization will be explored. There are two
important points to note: first, religions in general are sometimes afforded special protections in prison,
giving inmates a way to connect and meet that they otherwise would not have had. Second, jihadist strains
of Islam in particular are subject to special scrutiny in prison, making the recruitment and radicalization
process both opaque for outsiders seeking to study jihadists and difficult for the jihadists themselves.
Mark Hamm’s research shows that white supremacist and jihadist groups radicalize prisoners “based on a
prison gang model whereby inmates [go] through a process of one-on-one proselytizing by charismatic
leaders” (Hamm 2013, pg. 53). Khosrokhavar’s research confirms these findings. He explains that
radicalizers either seek out psychologically fragile individuals who have no knowledge of Islam or
inmates who have some knowledge of Islam and are also in need of physical protection (Khosrokhavar
2013, pgs. 297-8). For both groups, “Becoming a Muslim automatically provides them with the protection
of community members, particularly if they adhere (as they do in the majority of cases) to the Salafist or
radical tenet of Islam” (Khosrokhavar 2013, pg. 298). Obviously, the individuals discussed here seek out
group membership in a certain religious group, but many social scientists that have studied Islamic
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radicalization seek to explain it away as either a political or strategic choice (Pape 2010; Scheuer 2004).
While all terror groups have demands that they seek to reach through violent means (or the threat of
violent means), jihadists’ beliefs are not simply interchangeable with any other belief system. For
instance, in order to truly understand the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, one must have a deep
understanding of certain Islamic beliefs such as the coming of the apocalypse and the return of the Mahdi
(basically, the Messiah) (McCants 2015).
As correctional officers have hemmed in jihadist activities the world over, those that seek to
radicalize others have adjusted. Farhad Khosrokhavar, a sociologist at École des Hautes Études en
Sciences-Sociales, has done extensive research on French prisons and prisoners in which he interviewed
“160 inmates and many guards, doctors and social workers in four major facilities, some among the
largest in Europe” (Khosrokhavar 2015). In a 2013 journal article, Khosrokhavar writes that radicalization
in French prisons happens in small groups of typically two or three individuals to evade authority
(Khosrokhavar 2013, pg. 288). He notes in a 2015 New York Times piece that prison is an integral part of
the “typical trajectory” of French jihadists. That trajectory begins with cultural alienation in France which
leads to petty crime, prison, radicalization, and “an initiatory journey to a Muslim country like Syria,
Afghanistan or Yemen to train for jihad” (Khosrokhavar 2015).
Religion plays a critical role in inmates’ lives. Many of them find religion while incarcerated due
to the stresses of prison life. As Patrick Dunleavy notes on this point: “there are no atheists in foxholes”
(Dunleavy 2011, pg. 22). Jim Thomas and Barbara Zaitzow’s research shows that inmates are more likely
to convert religions in maximum security prisons than in medium- or minimum-security ones. To this
end, the harshness of the prison conditions seems to be a factor in leading to religious conversion
(Thomas and Zaitzow 2004, pg. 242). Religious study and the solace that a religious worldview brings,
certainly help an individual survive in prison. But religious gangs or groups in prison also have some
important differences from other associations that prisoners join.
First and foremost, there are certain privileges and accommodations that are given to the various
religious groups in prison. In New York State, prisoners cannot be denied access to clergy. In fact, “Any
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religious worker could demand to enter a prison in the New York system without restriction” (Dunleavy
2011, pg. 61). Prisoners can also use the link to a prison chaplain to, for instance, send a package or a
letter or even to bring in contraband (Allen and Costa 1981).
Patrick Dunleavy, a former deputy inspector general of the Criminal Intelligence Unit of the New
York State Department of Correctional Services, developed intimate knowledge of how those who seek to
radicalize others to the causes of jihadism operate in US prison through his involvement in Operation
Hades, an investigation of radical Islamic recruitment inside and outside of US prisons. Dunleavy follows
the exploits of Abdel Nasser Zaben, a Palestinian jihadist who migrated to Brooklyn in the early 1990s to
recruit others and carry out attacks. Despite his strict interpretation of Islam, Zaben was arrested and sent
to Rikers Island after being arrested for a series of armed robberies and kidnappings (Dunleavy 2011, pgs.
16-21). In prison, Zaben not only linked up with other radicals such as Hamas fighter Rashid Baz, who
was convicted for a 1994 shooting of Hasidic Jewish students on the Brooklyn Bridge, but also
encountered psychologically pliable individuals whom he worked to radicalize (Dunleavy 2011, pg. 25).
Michael Lombard, a 55-year-old Italian American only child, certainly does not fit the profile that most
people envision as a jihadist terrorist. But, alone in prison, without his codependent mother for the first
time in his life, Lombard was converted to Islam by Zaben (Dunleavy 2011, pg. 37). Remarkably,
Lombard’s mother also converted to Islam soon afterward (Dunleavy 2011, pgs. 40). Lombard’s hatred of
Jews (he was in prison for shooting a Jewish eye doctor who botched an eye procedure), feeling of
isolation and psychological vulnerability made him an easy mark for Zaben (Dunleavy 2011, pg. 36).
Wiretapped phone conversations between Lombard and his mother captured the two plotting attacks
against prominent politicians (Dunleavy 2011, pgs. 40-2).
Abdel Zaben, Rashid Baz, and Edwin Lemmons, another one of Zaben’s converts, all served as
personal assistants to the Muslim chaplain at various times. While the New York Department of
Corrections had a committee for approving such appointments that was supposed to take into account the
needs of the prison and security, in reality a chaplain’s recommendation was good enough for a rubber
stamped approval (Dunleavy 2011, pg. 52). In this way, inmates could access the chaplain’s phone to
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communicate with operatives on the outside. In the case of Abdel Zaben, thousands of calls were made by
the Muslim chaplain on Zaben’s behalf to “radical Islamic organizations and associates of incarcerated
terrorists in the United States, the Middle East, and North Africa.” Procedures put in place to list why
calls were made on an inmates’ behalf, to list who was called, and to charge the inmate for the call were
all not followed (Dunleavy 2011, pgs. 64-5).
From this example, we see that religious groups have important privileges in prisons. Religious
services provide a meeting place for co-religionists that does not have the same protections around the
world as other types of organizations in prison (Dunleavy 2011, pgs. 31-2). Further, religious clergy can
serve as connectors linking the incarcerated to the outside world—for better or worse.
Another factor that differentiates religion, particularly radical Islam, from other types of
associations prisoners could make is the vicarious suffering felt by Islamic extremists worldwide. Marc
Sageman writes that jihadists feel a sense of “moral outrage” and “vicarious humiliation” when they see
their co-religionists suffer in wars and conflicts in sometimes-foreign lands. As Sageman explains: “The
humiliation of friends can evoke strong anger… Anger brings the desire to right a wrong, and this may
lead to violence” (Sageman 2008, pgs. 72-3). Being part of a large group of co-religionists that are
suffering at the hands of “world powers” or “the government,” and whose suffering shows that they are
on the side of justice can be an especially attractive proposition for prisoners. As Khosrokhavar writes,
“Radical preaching catches on because it offers young Muslim prisoners a way to escape their
predicament and develop a fantasy of omnipotence by declaring death onto their oppressors”
(Khosrokhavar 2015). Further he notes that “international politics,” specifically “the predicament of
Muslims globally” that inmates follow daily on television, fuel “a radical version of Islam as the ‘religion
of the oppressed’” (Khosrokhavar 2013, pgs. 288-9). Religion, then, provides multiple psychic and social
goods by giving inmates solace, a protective association, and a set of established grievances to fight
against all while having the special status of a belief system that needs to be accommodated in many
countries.
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In the Middle East, this dynamic works a bit differently as fundamentalist religion is restricted by
most regimes due to its connection to terrorism in the region, and due to its role as a potential regime
destabilizer. Despite these restrictions, religion is the one means by which people are allowed to “protest”
the regime in many Middle Eastern nations due to strictures on free speech and even freedom of
association (Haugbolle 2010, pg. 227). An emblematic case that exemplifies the religious-secular divide
can be seen in Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood has wrestled with the government ever since its
1928 inception during the times of King Farouk (Lapidus 1983). The long-standing organization of
counter-government religious associations explains the Muslim Brotherhood’s national election victory in
2013, Hamas’ national electoral victory in the Palestinian Territories in 2006, as well as the Islamic
Salvation Front’s short-lived victory in Algeria in 1991 (Kilpatrick 2012; Wilson 2006; Murphy 1991).
Due to this connection between religion and opposition to government, religious prisoners are treated
particularly poorly in many Middle Eastern and North African countries. Haugbolle notes that people in
the Middle East additionally suffer from “the prison of living in a restrictive society” where religious
freedoms are squashed and regime loyalty is paramount (Haugbolle 2010, pg. 227).
Prison has played a prominent role in the radicalization of Middle Eastern Muslim figures since
ibn Tamiya, one of the fathers of contemporary jihadism, died in prison in 1328. Later, Sayyid Qutb, one
of Tamiya’s recent and most prominent theological descendants, was tortured, abused and, in 1966,
executed in Egypt for his radical beliefs and opposition to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s government (Hanna,
Clutterbuck, and Rubin 2008, pg. 27). Current al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri came to worldwide
prominence after he was detained and tortured for allegedly being part of the plot to assassinate Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat (Hanna, Clutterbuck, and Rubin 2008, pg. 28).
In Muslim-majority countries, torture is a critical component of the experience of incarceration
and it seems to exacerbate the problem with radicalization. While torture can get jihadists to turn on their
compatriots, even Ayman al-Zawahiri is said to have “betrayed a comrade” after being tortured (Hanna,
Clutterbuck, and Rubin 2008, pg. 28), it also turns jihadists even further against the government. Torture
at the hands of Americans at Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo, or at the hands of Egyptian, Libyan, Jordanian,
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or other security forces serves to unite jihadists and further alienate them from government forces.
Jihadists even have produced instructions for each other on how to defend themselves at trial by pointing
to human rights abuses by their captors (Hanna, Clutterbuck, and Rubin 2008, pg. 69). Being tortured by
their captors reinforces the jihadist view that their enemies are evil, irreligious and immoral. To this end,
while torture can help security forces glean information, it can also be a major component in the
radicalization process. Torture can serve the same ends as vicarious humiliation by angering the inmate
and giving him or her a group or entity to oppose.
Finally, the role of religion in prison is different from other forms of radicalization because
religious study can be carried out in prison whereas other forms of extremist literature may be banned in
detention facilities. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is said to have memorized the Quran while in prison (Reidel
2010, pg. 93). Further Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one of the most important living jihadist thinkers,
argues that prison is a place where the jihadist can solidify his faith. In an article entitled “Prison: heavens
and fires” he wrote that in prison a religious extremist can focus on “obeying God, worshipping him,
memorizing the Quran, seeking and spreading Da’wah [meaning: the proselytizing of Islam] and learning
from the experience of those around him to become stronger for jihad” (Hanna, Clutterbuck, and Rubin
2008, pg. 29).
As can now be seen, religion both protects and harms Muslim prisoners. It protects them when
religious prisoners are given special time to meet and study, but it also harms them by exposing them to
scrutiny all over the world. On the plus side, it not only helps prisoners by giving them the protection and
social goods that come with joining an organization, it also has a special place in prison that makes
religion a good cover for engaging in criminal activities. Moreover, religion links inmates to a wider
group of people with whom the inmate can feel a sense of vicarious suffering. Yet the negatives of prison
are also many for the jihadist prisoner, the torture that Muslim religious extremists face in prisons and
detention centers reinforces their belief in a Manichaean world of evil Crusaders and corrupt Muslim
governments fighting against true believers. As the potential for jihadist radicalization has been
discovered the world over, radical Muslim prisoners have received increased scrutiny, which includes
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more solitary confinement and even torture (Khosrokhavar 2013; Ganor and Falk 2013; Haugbolle 2010).
Similar arguments can be made of religious charities and how radical prisoners might exploit them to
fund crime: while religious charities have special protections in some cases, Islamic religious charities in
particular have been reserved for special scrutiny (Dunleavy 2011, pg. 32).
Jihadist religious affiliation does have its drawbacks since those who run prisons the world over
are today conscious of the potential for and effects of Islamic radicalization. To this end, jihadists today,
as Khosrokhavar explains (Khosrokhavar 2013, pg. 295), may need to work to hide their behavior in
prison even more than other criminal enterprises do. This makes life in prison for jihadists perhaps similar
to life outside of it where so-called taqfiris hide their religious affiliation in the modern world by, for
example, not growing out their beards and by dressing in a secular fashion.

The Role of the Outside World

As discussed in the introduction, readers at this point may wonder why any given prisoner would
turn to jihadism rather than Marxism, white supremacy or any other ideology while in prison. In the
previous section, the role religion plays in prison, both good and bad, vis-à-vis the incarcerated was
discussed which provides a partial answer to the question. But, one could still be curious about why
prisoners choose jihadist interpretations of Islam over literally any other religion.
In this section, the role of the outside world will be brought in to help explain why prisoners turn
to jihadist ideologies. As Mark Hamm emphasizes, prisoner radicalization “is a very old issue” that is
“tempered and shaped by the prevailing events of the times in which it occurs” (Hamm 2013, pg. 1).
Hamm shows how social movements going on outside prisons affect the choices and perceptions of those
inside prisons. For instance, in the 1960s, many black prisoners sought out anti-establishment and black
nationalist groups due to movements like the Black Panthers becoming popular in the wider society
(Hamm 2013, pg. 34). The book Soledad Brother describes a similar process (Jackson 1994). As Stephen
Rascoff notes, counter-radicalization seeks to prevent violence by “shaping the ideational currents that are
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thought to underpin that violence” (Rascoff 2012, pg. 127). Those currents come from both within the
prison and from the outside world.
Critical criminologists seek to explain the incidence of crime, such as terrorism, by looking at
power differentials in the wider society not just at the forensics of the crime itself. Without looking at the
broader picture, the reason why some prisoners turn to jihadism cannot be landed on because the critic
can always ask “Why jihadism and not something else?” By looking at the outside world, we can explain,
for instance, why a Palestinian prisoner turns to religious extremism after a stay in an Israeli detention
facility. This fictive inmate latches on to ideologies that exist in the wider Palestinian society and turns to
hate the Israelis for their occupation of his lands. Jihadism, then, is a routinized form of protest in the face
of power differentials in the wider society.
Tensions between indigenous Europeans and late-generation Muslim immigrations have been
enflamed throughout Europe. Examples of the failure of Muslim integration in Europe are plentiful
including riots in Paris’ banlieu (Chrisafis 2015), Switzerland’s constitutional ban on new minarets on
mosques (NBC News 2009), the banning of the veil in France and, potentially, Germany’s ban of the
burqa (Smale 2016), the Netherlands’ ban on the export of halal meat (Lewis 2016) and the rise of farright groups and Islamophobia across the continent (Walker and Taylor 2011). The flood of Muslim
immigrants that came to Europe after World War II have, in sum, not been well assimilated into European
society (Leiken 2005). Muslim unemployment in Molenbeek, the Belgian neighborhood described by
media sources as an incubator for terror (Higgins and Freytas-Timuras 2015), is 30% (De Winter 2016).
While Europe and the United States have similar legal systems, the problem of jihadist radicalization is
greater in Europe due to a larger proportion of Muslims there. The European Union has a six percent
Muslim population while America is one percent Muslim (Hackett 2015; Mohamed 2016). Other factors
which include the lower income of European Muslims as compared to American Muslims, European
policing practices, and the lower assimilation rates of European Muslims as compared to American
Muslims play a role in Muslim radicalization there. In Europe, concepts of community policing have not
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yet caught on so incidences of white police officers harassing immigrant Muslims are common (Sageman
2008, ch. 5).
Large disaffected minority groups are susceptible to turn to extremism due to their treatment by
the majority. European Muslims radicalize whether in prison or outside of it due to the discrimination
their people face in Europe. However, the question may be posed “Why Muslims?” Many people are illtreated the world over, but few turn to terrorist behavior. The reason that Muslims turn to these belief
systems is that they are available in the wider Muslim society. After the failure of Arab secular
governments to defeat Israel or provide good lives for their people, an increasing number of Middle
Eastern Muslims turned to religion as a way to challenge the existing structure and to attempt to make
change (Martin 2016, pg. 134). Emblematic of these changes was the rise of Hamas among the
Palestinians, after the failure of the Palestinian Authority became increasingly perceived as ineffective
and corrupt (Martin 2016, pgs. 134-135). Ayman Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s leader, was part of the vanguard
generation in Egypt that turned to the Muslim Brotherhood as a protest against their regime’s peace deal
with Israel. This wave of religious extremism was exacerbated by the successes of al Qaeda against the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan and against America on 9/11 (Martin 2016). The existence of religious
extremist groups in the Middle East fighting the establishment and the success of some of these groups
explains why Muslims have lately turned to radical religious organizations more than other groups have.
Wars between the West and Muslim nations have also led Muslims to turn to extremist
ideologies. These wars include Israel’s invasion of Lebanon which created the radical Shia group
Hezbollah and the second war in Iraq which created al Qaeda in Iraq—a group that later became ISIS.
Drone strikes and wars in the Muslim World create grievances that can’t be overstated. Hundreds of
thousands of Iraqis have been killed since America’s invasion in 2003 (Iraq Body Count). France’s
bombing of Mali and its treatment of Algerians during its time as colonizer there have also led to a rise in
terrorism (Haddad 2015).
In the Middle East, of course, there are much higher Muslim populations than in the West and, in
most cases, fewer rights. Prison stays also are more likely to involve torture (Khalili and Schwedler 2010;
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Till 2011). One of the main recruitment centers and organizing hubs for ISIS is prisons. As Weiss and
Hassan report, “Whether by accident or design, jailhouses in the Middle East have served for years as
virtual terror academies, where known extremists can congregate, plot, organize, and hone their
leadership skills ‘inside the wire,’ and most ominously recruit a new generation of fighters” (Weiss and
Hassan 2015, pg. xv). For some Middle Eastern prisoners, incarceration led to popularity; for instance,
Ayman al Zawahiri gained “global notoriety” while detained (Weiss and Hassan 2015, pg. 5). For others
inmates, prison taught them how to fight the dictatorial regimes they opposed. Hassan and Weiss say that
“Prison was [Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s] university” (Weiss and Hassan 2015, pg. 9). Like with other
criminals that join like-minded felons while behind bars, jihadists link up with one other in prison and
radicalize each other, a process that happened in spades in Syria under the brutal rule of the Assad regime
(Weiss and Hassan 2015, pgs. 145-146). The “outside world” in Iraq, where Sunni Muslim communities
are existentially threatened by the majority Shia, has led Hassan and Weiss to report that “Sunnis are
being radicalized at record proportions” (Weiss and Hassan 2015, pg. 240). It is no wonder then that
people like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the current leader of ISIS, had such great luck in recruiting his fellow
Iraqis to join jihadist causes and fight the Americans and the Shia while he was detained by US forces
(Weiss and Hassan 2015, pg. 119).
In the Middle East prison conditions and political conditions merge to create an environment
where prisoner radicalization flourishes. In such an environment, Boaz Ganor points out in his study of
the Israeli case, what security forces and the government call “Islamic radicalization” is seen by the
incarcerated as fighting for one’s rights against an occupation government (Ganor and Falk 2013). To this
end, strategies to quell radicalization need to involve both prisoner management and political policy
changes. In the final section, strategies to stop prisoner jihadist radicalization will be explored with an eye
toward solving the underlying political problems.
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Solutions to the Jihadist Problem in Prison: Prison Management and Political Management

Now that the radicalization process has been elaborated upon, it is time to explore solutions to
Islamic extremist radicalization in prison. Four main methods for dealing with radicalized prisoners will
be examined: segregation, isolation, moving prisoners frequently, and de-radicalization (also called
rehabilitation). The first three methods, which are more prison management solutions, will be separated
from rehabilitation, which can be seen as a political solution as well.

Segregation, Isolation and Moving Prisoners Frequently
Many countries see the advantage of separating those convicted of terrorism from other inmates.
Indeed, one of the underlying logics behind using prison as a punishment is to segregate convicts from the
general population (Veldhuis and Lindenberg 2012, pg. 425). In Saudi Arabia and Australia, separation is
practiced alongside de-radicalization programs (Jones and Morales 2012, pg. 218). Segregating the most
dangerous inmates surely removes the possibility of jihadists radicalizing other inmates. But it may be
difficult to figure out who the jihadists are given that if authorities knew who the worst perpetrators were
all the time, the prisoner radicalization issue would not exist. Further, grouping inmates of the same ilk
together may “create even stronger radicalizing cells within the prisons” (Birnbaum 2015). Segregating
radical Muslim prisoners is meant to prevent recruitment (Bouchaud 2014), but, for those with already
radical tendencies, segregation of prisoners may intensify extremist patterns. As Haugbolle notes of prerevolution Syria, “Most prisons separate Islamist convicts from their secular inmates. Once released,
former prisoners replicate those patterns of socialisation” (Haugbolle 2010, pg. 237). Boaz Ganor and
Ophir Falk find similar patterns in the Israeli case. There, they find that many prisoners had already been
radicalized and organize themselves by association with revolutionary or political groups (Fatah, Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, etc.) (Ganor and Falk 2013, pgs. 116-121). Moreover, even if segregation is a good
solution in some cases, resource constraints prevent poorer countries like the Philippines from using this
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method effectively as a segregated prison population requires its own staff and sometimes its own facility
(Jones and Morales 2012, pg. 220).
Segregation alone may not provide a solution to recidivism. In examining the Dutch case,
Veldhuis and Lindenberg note that after the 2004 killing of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam, the
Dutch government felt intense pressure to “do something” about radicalization in the Netherlands
(Veldhuis and Lindenberg 2012, pg. 434). In this case, the authors argue, short-term concerns won out as
public demand for change made long government deliberation untenable. A terrorism wing was created to
segregate radical inmates from the general prison population so as to reduce the likelihood of
proselytization. “However,” the authors observe. “No instruments [were] applied to rehabilitate or
reintegrate the inmates, with the result that little [was] done to prevent recidivism or radicalization after
inmates [were] released from the terrorism wing” (Veldhuis and Lindenberg 2012, pg. 437; Demant and
De Graaf 2010). As previously noted, recidivism is no small matter. Ganor, for instance, writes that,
“historically, some of the most prominent Palestinian terrorists, responsible for the most horrific attacks
against civilians, were released convicts” (Ganor and Falk 2013, pg. 124).
A more extreme version of segregation is solitary confinement or isolation wherein the individual
inmate is left alone for most or all of the day sometimes for the entire duration of his or her prison term.
So-called “supermax” prisons, which are becoming the norm in the West for housing those convicted of
terrorism, rely heavily on solitary confinement (Jones and Morales 2012, pg. 218). Such isolation has
been seen by human rights groups as well as psychologists as a form of abuse that can be tantamount to
torture (Amnesty International July 2014). As Jones and Morales note, solitary confinement has been
shown to be psychologically damaging to inmates and “may act to reinforce the psychology of exclusivity
and ‘martyrdom’” among them (Jones and Morales 2012, pg. 218). While isolating prisoners has similar
advantages to segregating them, it also has greater downsides. The human rights abuses inherent in
solitary confinement can become a rallying cry for jihadists that are emboldened by the suffering of their
peers at the hands of “infidel” forces. Further, isolating prisoners in places where inmates have no due
process rights and little or no access to lawyers like Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq, the Guantanamo Bay
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Detention Center in Cuba, and the many horrible prisons in places like Yemen, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and
Iran, creates situations where guards face little or no penalty for abusing and torturing inmates. The Abu
Ghraib abuse scandal is just the tip of the iceberg of prisoner abuse in situations when inmates are isolated
from the outside world—and sometimes each other—and guards can act with impunity. It should also be
noted here that jihadists have used the West’s isolation and dehumanization of terrorist convicts as a
recruiting tool and a symbol. Groups like ISIS make their Western hostages don the orange jumpsuits of
Guantanamo detainees to show both moral equivalency and to exact revenge.
A third prisoner management solution is moving inmates between prison facilities frequently. The
thought behind this management solution is to reduce the likelihood of prisoners’ recruiting others to
jihadist causes. Khosrokhavar writes that he encountered prisoners “who, in a decade, had been moved to
as many as 30 prisons!” He notes, however, that this movement did not serve the intended ends of the
French corrections services. Instead, many of these prisoners develop “anti-establishment views”
(Khosrokhavar 2013, pg. 302). One issue with moving prisoners is that the authorities move those that
they know are problem cases and who have not responded to other punishments (Khosrokhavar 2013, pg.
301). These prisoners are then allowed to germinate new connections in a new facility where staff may
not be fully aware of the risks they pose. As Patrick Dunleavy writes, “frequent inmate movement as a
management tool has long been a part of corrections” (Dunleavy 2011, pg. 47). However, while Abdel
Zaben’s movement to different prison facilities only allowed him to expose his views to new recruits and
make more connections with jihadist elements in the prison system (Dunleavy 2011, ch. 4). Moving
prisoners frequently, sometimes called “diesel therapy,” can be seen as a form of segregation as the
practice is meant to cut off inmates from the social connections they would otherwise make while
incarcerated.

Rehabilitation
De-radicalization, a process by which counselors and religious figures try to change the
worldviews of jihadist inmates and replace their violent tendencies with non-violent ones, can be seen as
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a political solution to these prison problems since this strategy actually deals with the motivations for
turning to jihadism both in prisons and in the outside world (Dugas and Kruglanski 2014, pg. 433). Here
de-radicalization and rehabilitation will be used interchangeably. The de-radicalizaiton process is
certainly a problematic one in countries where speech is protected and governments could be viewed as
trying to squash a religious view that they find objectionable (Mufson 2016). Yet, while efforts to shift
the terrorists’ mindset are part of these programs, they are not the only piece. The best de-radicalization
programs also provide the inmates with the “opportunity to air grievances in a non-violent fashion,”
vocational training, new social opportunities, and also try to help the inmates reintegrate into the general
public (Jones and Morales 2012, pg. 217). These approaches have been implemented all over the world
including in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, France, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Australia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, among other places.
With so many programs around the world, it is difficult to get a bead on whether de-radicalization
is an effective strategy or not. However, Dugas and Kruglanski’s scientific study of Sri Lanka’s deradicalization program for LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a.k.a. Tamil Tiger) members found
that the “rehabilitation program mattered in the changing attitudes” of the militants (Dugas and
Kruglanski 2014, pg. 436). Specifically, those LTTE members who were exposed to the de-radicalization
program saw a decline in their support for armed struggle while those that did not saw no change in their
attitudes toward armed struggle (Dugas and Kruglanski 2014, pg. 435).
In Israel, the de-radicalization program is coupled with a carrot-and-stick approach. Compliance
with the program brings more “family visits, telephone calls, canteen purchases…, preferred cooking
facilities and accommodations, and leisure activities.” Non-cooperative prisoners receive a series of
penalties (Ganor and Falk 2013, pg. 125).
Ganor and Falk likewise contend that de-radicalization programs are doomed to fail if prisoners
are not “segregated from their peers, held in special prisons or separate sections within a prison, and their
families provided with the necessary setting and protection by authorities” (Ganor 126). Still, the authors
argue that de-radicalizing Palestinian prisoners in Israel is an uphill battle even if everything is done
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according to best practices. This is because radical Palestinian prisoners have large networks in prison,
family connections outside of prison, a deep opposition to their enemies (the Israelis) that is based in
reality, and the knowledge that many Palestinian radicals have been released over the years, which
reduces the need to change (Ganor and Falk 2013, pgs. 127-8).
Saudi Arabia’s “Counselling Program” has received the most press for its purported high success
rate. This program, like the others, seeks to challenge the jihadists’ ideologies through dialogue with
religious figures as well as psychological counselling (Jones and Morales 2012, pg. 217). In the
Philippines a more holistic approach is being used as well. Staff are being educated about radicalization,
reforms meant to reduce corruption are taking place within prisons, and existing programs are being
augmented with more vocational training and family involvement (Jones and Morales 2012, pg. 215).
Marisa Porges has analyzed de-radicalization programs all over the world and found that though
they have not been a panacea, their overall effect has been positive. She notes that rehabilitating terror
convicts is a risky business given that letting even a small amount of radical prisoners go whose
rehabilitation has not been successful proves a massive risk even for countries that have extensive
security capabilities (Porges 2011, pg. 50). She notes that while de-radicalization may not always achieve
its objective, there are valuable secondary benefits to consider. Specifically, these programs can “forestall
radicalization among vulnerable groups, including the friends and families of imprisoned terrorists.”
Further, rehabilitation programs aid in intelligence gathering (Porges 2011, pg. 51).
Porges highlights that while the Saudi Counselling Program is normally lauded for its ability to
counter jihadist beliefs with non-violent ones, the Saudis have moved to a greater emphasis on changing
jihadist behavior rather than ideology. As Porges observes, Saudi professors, psychologists, security
officials and religious scholars teach a range of classes to prisoners, but courses on psychology,
sociology, art therapy, politics and history now greatly outnumber lessons on religion, sharia law and
Islamic culture.” The Saudis it seems have found vocational and “life skills” training to be vitally
important in reintegrating prisoners into Saudi society (Porges 2011, pg. 52). After all, a non-violent
ideology is nice to have, but a job can do wonders for one’s social status and sense of worth. Singapore
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has a similarly balanced de-radicalization program and the United States has tried to mirror the Saudi
program in their detention operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Porges 2011, pg. 52). Yemen, on the other
hand, has focused solely on religious reprogramming and their unsuccessful program was shuttered in
2005 after only three years (Porges 2011, pgs. 52-3). Of course, Saudi Arabia’s infamous adoption of
Wahhabist Islam and its export of this version of the religion confound the Gulf State’s efforts at
countering radicalism (Frontline, Inside Saudi Arabia).
As previously seen in the Philippines case, family engagement is an integral part of rehabilitation.
In Saudi Arabia, the government helps provide for jihadist prisoners’ families as an incentive toward
rehabilitation. In Iraq, Afghanistan and Singapore, family visits are encouraged so as to give the prisoner
social and psychological support and help in the reintegration effort. Many times “family members or
respected representatives from a detainee’s tribe or village are asked to take responsibility for a detainee
after release” (Porges 2011, pg. 53).
Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Singapore’s rehabilitation programs focus heavily on reintegrating
and helping the inmates successfully reenter society. Saudi Arabia’s focus on individually-tailored
programs complete with mentors has made replicating the Gulf nation’s success in de-radicalization
difficult (Porges 2011, pg. 54). Saudi officials, who held until January 2009 that their programs had a 100
percent success rate, now say that 80 to 90 percent of those who pass through their rehabilitation
programs de-radicalize. However, they are careful to note that these programs are not likely to turn “the
most committed terrorists” (Porges 2011, pg. 55).
Recidivism statistics are hard to come by for these programs as they rely on sometimesconfidential government and intelligence information. High-profile failures beg the question of whether
even a low recidivism rate is good enough. After all, graduates of Yemen’s rehabilitation program have
gone to Iraq to fight against the American occupation and Ali al-Shihri, a former Guantanamo detainee
who also graduated the Saudi program, rose to become the deputy commander of al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (Porges 2011, pg. 55). A recent Washington Post report detailed that a staggering 111 of the
532 Guantanamo detainees released as of March 2016 returned to terrorism. A Pentagon official
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confirmed in the report that Americans had died at the hands of these ex-detainees. Of the 111 released
detainees, fifty-seven are still alive and fighting—the rest were killed or captured (Lamothe 2016).
Of course, the Guantanamo detainees were not part of any Saudi-style rehabilitation program.
Instead, they were subject to harsh treatment tantamount to torture (Wikileaks 2011). As previously
argued, torture is certainly one method for managing terrorism suspects but rehabilitation seems to
provide better results for a variety of reasons. Torture rallies jihadists against the torturing country,
demonizes the country that does the torturing among its friends as well as its enemies, makes attacks
against the torturing country more justified in the eyes of extremists and perhaps others, and serves no
rehabilitational purpose.
The major methods of managing prisons so as to quell jihadism are summarized in the below
table.
Table One. Prisoner Management Solutions to Jihadism
Country
Approach
Successful?
Saudi Arabia, Singapore
De-radicalization
Saudis claim 80 to 90 percent success rate but
Philippines, and Sri Lanka
and reintegration
Saudi’s exportation of official Wahhabist
into society
ideology foments radicalization; No data from
Philippines; Singapore has seen anecdotal
success; Evidence of militants who went
through rehabilitation programs in Sri Lanka
reducing their support for armed struggle
Yemen
De-radicalization
Program failed with militants returning to al
only (no
Qaeda
reintegration
program)
Israel
Incentives and
Effectiveness confounded by ongoing conflict
attempts at
with Palestinians which reduces inmates desire
rehabilitation
to change
France, the Netherlands, the Segregation of
Unclear due to lack of data and newness of
UK, and Belgium, among
jihadist prisoners
policy in places like UK, but problem clearly
others
persists in Europe; segregated “terrorism
wings” may be incubators for jihadist planning
United States
Isolation in
High failure rate as 111 former Guantanamo
solitary
detainees have returned to terrorism.
confinement
(Guantanamo,
Supermax, etc.)
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Drones as an Alternative to Imprisonment?
While perhaps seeming outside the scope of this chapter, drone strikes have been used by the
United States, and increasingly other countries, as an alternative to imprisoning jihadists. Killing these
people clearly limits their ability to proselytize, so to some drone strikes may be a simpler and better
solution than imprisoning jihadists at all. With drone strikes, there is no worry that potential jihadists will
radicalize or that terrorists will recidivate.
Like torture, drone strikes do not provide the same benefits to inmates and governments seeking
public order that rehabilitation and other detention programs do. While detention programs surely have
their problems, and abuses within detention facilities fan the flames of extremism, the opaque, extrajudicial killing of terror suspects has even more negatives than torture and has become a critical
counterterrorism tool. After Israel was repeatedly condemned for its targeted killing campaign of
Palestinians during the second intifada (Toensing and Urbina 2003), one would have thought that the
world did not have the appetite for extra-judicial killings of terrorist suspects. However, the Barack
Obama administration has made drone strikes an all-too-common element of their anti-terrorism arsenal.
The British Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports that two British nationals whose citizenship was
revoked were soon after killed by US drones (Macklin 2014, pg. 8). America has even engaged in drone
strikes against its own citizens. These included the targeted assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki and Sameer
Khan in Yemen, the killing of Jude Kenan Mohamed in Pakistan, and the assassination of Kemal Dawish
and Abdulrahman al-Awlaki who were killed in separate strikes in Yemen. Another American, Warren
Weinstein, was inadvertently killed by a drone strike. The US government—in a 2011 secret memo—
detailed their legal justifications for these strikes (Taylor 2015). This is despite an executive order
prohibiting assassinations carried out by American personnel (Scahill 2016, pg. 2).
As Jo Becker and Scott Shane observe, “Drones have replaced Guantánamo as the recruiting tool
of choice for militants; in his 2010 guilty plea, Faisal Shahzad, who had tried to set off a car bomb in
Times Square, justified targeting civilians by telling the judge, ‘When the drones hit, they don’t see
children’” (Becker and Shane 2012). The United States has carried out more than 400 drone strikes in
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countries like Pakistan, Yemen and Iraq, which has resulted in thousands of deaths many of which are
innocent civilians. “The proliferating mistakes have given drones a sinister reputation in Pakistan and
Yemen and have provoked a powerful anti-American backlash in the Muslim world. Part of the collateral
damage in the strikes has been Mr. Obama’s dream of restoring the United States’ reputation with
Muslims around the globe” (Shane 2015). Drone strikes and the killing of terrorist suspects certainly have
their place—some terrorists may be impossible to neutralize otherwise and others may be too dangerous
or difficult to capture. Still, the wanton use of targeted killings of terror suspects kills innocent civilians
while providing a recruiting platform for jihadists. For these reasons, prison is the better option.

Political Solutions
Aside from prison management solutions, rehabilitation and drone strikes, the political conditions
that lead people to radicalize must be examined. Moving inmates from one cell block to another or
isolating them in ever-more-elaborate prisons ignores the very real fact that these solutions deal with
symptoms but not the root-cause of the problem. People turn to jihadist groups for many reasons some of
which include decades of dictatorial government in the Middle East coupled with the quashing of
religious expression. Conflicts in the region have further exacerbated the problem as the so-called Arab
Spring and American military interventions have combined to leave chaotic regions full of internecine
warfare where the countries Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Libya once stood. As seen in the Israeli case,
reprogramming Palestinian radicals would surely work better if they did not have very real grievances
that pushed them toward radical ideologies. As Marisa Porges underlines, “relying on recividism figures
largely ignores the political and social context in which a deradicalization program operates and the
security environment into which a program releases graduates” (Porges 2011, pg. 55).
While peace between warring parties and a more stable Middle East look unlikely in the nearterm, short-term political solutions can include reforms in the Middle East and elsewhere that lead to
better treatment of citizens, the enforcement of human rights for prisoners and the eradication of torture.
Saudi Arabia could also work to tone down some of the messages it spreads through its Wahhabist faith,
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such as those that are intolerant toward non-Muslims and Shi’as (Frontline, Saudi Arabia). Small steps
towards liberalization, civil rights, and participatory politics in the Middle East and North Africa will also
certainly help. So will greater integration and acceptance of Muslim immigrants in the West, especially
given the historic immigrant waves coming to Europe from Afghanistan, Syria, Eritrea, and elsewhere.

Conclusion
Stopping terrorist radicalization has become a critical security issue in the twenty-first century.
As many terrorists group together and radicalize in prison, breaking the prison-jihadism pipeline is an
important piece of the counterterrorism fight. Understanding how and why radicalization occurs in prison
is important—as is understanding why people radicalize on the outside.
Examining the issue from the American perspective, a recent Institute for Social Policy and
Understanding report provides some important insights, finding that “despite the existence of an estimated
350,000 Muslim prisoners, there is little evidence of widespread radicalization or successful foreign
recruitment” in the American prison system (SpearIt 2013, pg. 5). Despite Islam being the fastest growing
religion in U.S. prisons, as 80% of prison conversions are conversions to the Muslim faith, the report
holds that radicalization among the American Muslim prison population is rare and, even when it occurs,
may not lead to violence (SpearIt 2013, pg. 6, 9). It goes on to argue that Muslim inmates in the U.S. need
better religious accommodations, such as more and better Islamic chaplains and better re-entry programs
(SpearIt 2013, pgs. 39-42). Finally, the report contends that religion is a net-positive for inmates and
Muslim inmates are more likely to have their rights infringed upon than to infringe on the rights of others
(SpearIt 2013, pgs. 12, 14-5, 17).
While it is true that we should never conflate Islam with radicalism or jihadism, and that the vast
majority of Muslims are non-violent people, the same conundrum faces security forces inside and outside
of prison. Muslim radicals are viewed as a particularly noxious threat in many countries all over the world
be they Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Chechen separatists in Russia, or Islamic State
operatives in France, Belgium or Turkey. People the world over point to horrible attacks, some of which
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were carried out by people radicalized in prison, such as the 2015 attacks in Paris, the 2016 attacks in
Brussels and Turkey, and similar recent attacks in Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere.
In many places, governments have sullied entire populations by accusing their people of
harboring terrorists—a label that can lead to a person losing all of his or her rights including the right to
life, due process and citizenship (Ahmed 2013, ch. 5; Macklin 2014). Jihadist radicalization, such as what
occurred in the cases of Abdel Zaben, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and many others,
cannot be easily stopped in such a context where Muslims feel threatened and attacked. Political solutions
are necessary in conjunction with using best practices in inmate management to quell the problem.
Holistic de-radicalization programs that work to reintegrate, rather than reprogram, individuals
seem to have the most promise for stopping the pipeline from prison to jihad. Other methods such as
segregation of those convicted of terrorist crimes, and in extreme cases isolation, may be necessary in
conjunction with rehabilitation plans. Belgium’s approach, for instance, to radicalization in prison has
been a mix of two elements: the first is to segregate the jihadist prisoners from the general population and
the second is to improve prison conditions. Improvements include reducing overcrowding and providing
more services, including religious, psychological, and educational, for Muslim prisoners (Mufson 2016).
Torture, drone strikes, and the open-ended housing of jihadist inmates in detention centers cannot be
recommended due to their heavy drawbacks.
Critical criminology shows us that social factors are the most important ones in determining
whether or not people will turn to jihadism. To this end, political solutions, in the Middle East and in the
Muslim diaspora, are necessary for giving Muslims hope and better life opportunities that will ultimately
make jihadism appear to be an unwise path. As seen in the Saudi case, providing opportunities, such as
jobs, is critical to eradicating jihadism as a belief system inside and outside of prisons. Better integrating
Muslims into European societies is also a necessary component of any solution. While prisons need to
reduce overcrowding, provide all inmates with greater care, cater more to Muslim inmates, end prisoner
abuse, and work to rehabilitate jihadists, prison management solutions alone are not going to stop
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jihadism from rising inside or outside of detention facilities. Political solutions that give young Muslims
hope and employment, that integrate Muslims into Western societies and that liberalize the Middle East
will ultimately be the factors that break the prison-jihadism pipeline.
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